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Abstract
The purpose of this article, on the basis of a specific Dutch example, is to discuss
some methodological problems that criminologists and/or criminal lawyers face
when dealing with atrocities committed in the past. Can we legitimately apply
contemporary concepts to describe/explain historical events? Or are we guilty of a
‘sin’ of anachronism because we ascribe meanings to actions that these did not (or
could not) have at the time they were performed? Generally, most criminologists
turn their attention to contemporary phenomena and, therefore, do not have to
worry about the time dimension. However, when studying international crimes,
which are often historical events, this should not happen. When dealing with
crimes of a previous regime,, we should be aware of some methodological problems
linked to the use of (contemporary) concepts to describe and explain events of the
past. Legal scholars may also encounter problems when applying contemporary
concepts to past atrocities.
1. Introduction
In April 1998, it became publicly known that Hendrikus Colijn (18691944) ç
Dutch Prime Minister from 1925 to 1926 and from 1933 to 1939 ç had been
involved in the killing of civilians during a series of military actions in the
late 19th and early 20th century in an effort to consolidate Dutch colonial
rule over territories that, today, form part of the Republic of Indonesia. Colijn’s
involvement in the ‘pacification’ was disclosed by historian Herman Langeveld.
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In his biography of Colijn,1 he quoted from personal letters in which the 25-
year-old lieutenant Colijn tells his wife and parents about a raid on the palace
of the Raja in the town of Tjakra Negara (1894) on the island of Lombok. He
writes to his wife:
I have seen a woman with a child of about six months on her left arm and a long lance in
her right hand, storming at us. One of our bullets killed mother and child. We were not
allowed to show mercy. I had to have nine women and three children, who were asking
for mercy, rounded up and shot. It was unpleasant work but there was no other way. The
soldiers enjoyed piercing them with their bayonets. It was terrible work. I’ll stop now.2
In a letter to his parents, he goes on:
After the eighth attack, a few remained who were asking for mercy ç thirteen, I believe.
The soldiers looked questioningly at me. Thirty of my men were dead or wounded. I
turned around to light a cigar. There were some heartbreaking cries and when I turned
around again, those thirteen were dead, too.3
Disclosure of these passages led to what historian Jan Blokker called a ‘War
on Colijn’.4 What started as a scholarly discussion, escalated into a clash
about the reputation of the former prime minister. It was Colijn’s biographer
Langeveld who ç unintentionally ç triggered it. In an interview with him,
entitled ‘Colijn’s behavior was wrong, even for that era’, it was suggested that:
‘following the standards of the contemporary Yugoslavia-tribunal he [Colijn]
would have been a war criminal’.5
In an indignant reaction to this claim, fellow historian Jan de Bruijn argued
that by accusing Colijn ç retrospectively ç of war crimes, Langeveld had
committed a form of ‘a-historic moralism’.6 From a historical perspective, he
argued, contemporary values and norms should not be applied to events that
took place in the past. Rather, what has happened or been done in the past
should be seen in the context of that time. So, even if we find that, according
to contemporary standards, the Dutch colonial army acted unacceptably, we
should take into account that, a century ago, public opinion looked at this
differently and generally accepted what we today would consider war crimes.
Thus, from a historical perspective, Colijn should not be seen as a war criminal
but as ‘a child of his time’.7
1 H. Langeveld, Schipper naast God. Hendrikus Colijn 1869-1944 (Balans, 1998).
2 H. Colijn in a letter to Helena Colijn-Groenenberg, 24 November 1894. In Langeveld, supra note
1, at 59 (Translation,W.d.H.).
3 Ibid.
4 DeVolkskrant, 1 May 1998.
5 De Volkskrant, 16 April 1998. In a reaction to a complaint by Langeveld, journalist Jeroen
Trommelen admitted that the comparison with the Yugoslavia tribunal had not been made by
him. Trommelen had used the comparison as a journalistic device to link the interview to cur-
rent affairs (H. Langeveld, personal communication).
6 J. de Bruijn, ‘Inleiding’, in H. Colijn, De Slag om Tjakra Negara, een verslag in drie brieven (VU
Uitgeverij, 1998).
7 As a case in point, Lieutenant Colijn was awarded the MilitaryWillems Order for courage, pru-
dence and fidelity.
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In reaction to De Bruijn, Blokker countered that acts of historical figures
might have been considered immoral or criminal by their contemporaries
even at the time they were committed. He referred to Langeveld who, in his
biography of Colijn, had shown that in fact at least one eye witness did
acknowledge and morally condemn the atrocities that took place. In 1902,
captain J.J.B. Fanoy wrote in a letter that ‘the horrors of our clean-up continue
in the form of killing the wounded and captives, shooting the unarmed, etc.,
etc’.8 Fanoy even specifically called Colijn’s acts ‘cold-blooded murder’ and
noted that the lieutenant had a reputation for being ‘one of the worst
executioners’.9 Blokker argued that one therefore cannot maintain ç like De
Bruijn ç that what we consider crimes of war today were necessarily seen as
‘normal’ at the time. Neither does the fact that Lieutenant Colijn was never
indicted prove that his comportment was acceptable for his contemporaries.
One cannot possibly maintain that these acts were not war crimes just because
they were not labelled as such at the time they were committed. Elsbeth Etty,
professor of literary criticism, retorted that De Bruijn’s claim ç that from a
historical perspective Colijn should be seen as ‘a child of his time’ ç reveals a
double standard, if only because: ‘No one ever said that of Eichmann or
Karadzic’.10 In her view, Colijn is ‘a criminal in the context of any time’.11
2. A Legal Thought Experiment
The claim that Colijn would be a war criminal according to the standards of
today’s law as expressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) is clearly anachronistic. Nonetheless, we could consider it
as a hypothesis and ç also hypothetically ç verify whether Lieutenant
Colijn would have been convicted by the ICTY.12 Such an experiment could be
conceived in two ways: either as if the historical atrocities in which
Lieutenant Colijn was involved, had taken place within the ‘contemporary’
context of former Yugoslavia, or as if the ICTY had jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the past, setting aside the limits of its mandate both in time and
space.
In the first scenario, the question to be answered would be: Is there sufficient
evidence and are there sufficient legal grounds to conclude that Lieutenant
Colijn (or someone contemporarily behaving like he did), would indeed be con-
victed by the ICTY? Most relevant to the answer to this question is the ICTY’s
jurisprudence in the so-called C› elibic¤ i case,13 named after the concentration
camp in which the war crimes were committed for which camp commander
8 Quoted by Langeveld, supra note 1.
9 Ibid.
10 NRC Handelsblad, 18 April 1998.
11 Ibid.
12 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), 25 May 1993, as last amended by UN Doc. S/RES/1877 (2009), 7 July 2009.
13 Judgment, Mucic¤ et al. (IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001.
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Mucic¤ stood trial. The ICTYconvicted Mucic¤ for war crimes that had been com-
mitted by his subordinates, on the basis of the doctrine of command or super-
ior responsibility, i.e. under certain conditions a superior ç military or
civilian leader ç can be held criminally responsible for international crimes
committed by his subordinates.14
The doctrine of command or superior responsibility, which originated in
international humanitarian law, entered the realm of criminal law after World
War II when it proved to be useful for the prosecution and trial of the
masterminds of mass atrocities and international crimes.15 More recently, the
doctrine has been incorporated into the statutes of the ad hoc international
criminal tribunals and into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC).16 Since then, it has been applied by international criminal
tribunals such as the ICTY which ç in the C› elebic¤ i case ç convicted camp
commander Mucic¤ on the grounds that there had been a line of command;
that he as a commander knew or had to know that his subordinates had
committed or were about to commit the crimes; and that he as a commander
neither took measures to prevent the crimes, nor punished the perpetrators.
In his function as a commander, he was, therefore, held responsible for these
crimes even though he was only indirectly involved in them.17 The conviction
of the camp commander Mucic¤ was the first on the basis of ‘superior
responsibility’ since the war tribunals of Nuremburg and Tokyo.
Like camp commander Mucic¤ , lieutenant Colijn carried superior
responsibility in a line of command. As the quotations from the letters to his
wife and his parents prove, he knew that his subordinates were about to
commit an atrocity and he also knew that they already had committed a
similar atrocity under his command and even possibly on his own orders.
Moreover, he had not taken sufficient measures to prevent the atrocities, nor
to punish the perpetrators for committing them. In theory, then, these facts
could suffice to prove the three constituent elements of command responsibil-
ity: he was in command and control, had reason to know what (had) happened
and failed to take the reasonable and necessary steps to punish the perpetra-
tors or prevent future atrocities.
14 E. van Sliedregt, ‘System Criminality at the ICTY: Individual Responsibility & Collective
Criminality’, in W.N. Nollkaemper and H.G. van der Wilt (eds), System Criminality (Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 183^200.
15 See H.G. van der Wilt, Command Responsibility (Oxford Bibliographies Online, 2013).
16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998, entered
into force on 1 July 2002 (‘ICCSt.).
17 Judgement, Delalic¤ et al. (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, x 1285, at 441^443
(convicting Mucic¤ and sentencing him to 7 years’ imprisonment). The C› elebic¤ i case was ap-
pealed (in 2001), retried in the first instance (also 2001) and re-appealed (in 2003). See
Judgement, Mucic¤ et al. (IT-96-21-A), Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, at 306^307;
Sentencing Judgement, Mucic¤ et al. (IT-96-21-Tbis-R117), Trial Chamber, 9 October 2001 (sen-
tencing Mucic¤ to 9 years’ imprisonment); Judgment on Sentence Appeal, Mucic¤ et al.
(IT-96-21-Abis), Appeals Chamber, 8 April 2003, x 61 (upholding the sentences imposed by the
Trial Chamber).
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We must also ask, on the basis of what he says in his letters, whether there
are any defences available to Colijn that would negate or mitigate his
responsibility. In the letter to his wife, Colijn wrote that ‘we were not allowed to
show mercy’, which could be interpreted as calling on a superior order (Befehl
ist Befehl) as a justification for the actions. Article 7(4) ICTY Statute rules out
a superior order as a defence, but it may be used in mitigation of punishment.
The Tribunal has also recognized that a superior order, together with other
circumstances (e.g. prospects of execution), may constitute a form of duress
that the defendant could not be expected to withstand because of the dire
consequences to himself. There is nothing in Colijn’s letters to show that this
was the case or that he had any reason to fear such consequences: he simply
alludes to not being allowed to show mercy ç a mindless following of orders
which, given that he himself was in a superior position, would also be unlikely
to result in mitigation of punishment.
The same passage could also be interpreted as meaning: ‘it was impossible to
show mercy’, which could be invoking a higher loyalty, i.e. his duty to protect
his men. Their safety might have been endangered by the ç intentional or
accidental ç killing of a woman and her child ‘by one of our bullets’. He
might have had reasons to fear the consequences because, as he wrote to his
parents: ‘Thirty of my men were dead or wounded’. This is then an appeal to a
form of necessity ç in this case military necessity. Even though ICTY
jurisprudence recognizes the relevance of the principle of military necessity
in relation to war crimes, it nevertheless requires that the actions were
reasonable and proportionate. That might (just) apply to the killing of the
woman, although the action taken seems hardly proportionate (a woman
with a baby in her arms and a lance against a body of men armed with rifles),
while killing the baby as well could probably have been avoided. It certainly
does not apply to the other women and children who were rounded up and
shot. The letter to his parents (‘a few remained who were asking for mercy ç
thirteen, I believe’) clearly implies that the few who had survived the
skirmishes were either surrendering or wounded, or possibly both, so that
there was no military necessity in the first place.
Finally, self-defence has been recognized by the ICTY as a valid ground for
excluding criminal liability, provided that the acts constitute a reasonable,
necessary and proportionate reaction to the attack, i.e. that the act of self-
defence took place in response to an attack on a protected person or property
and was proportionate to the degree of danger.18 The killing of defenceless
women and children who have been ‘rounded up’ and of a surrendering or
wounded enemy is not a form of self-defence (for there is no attack).
Conceivably, self-defence could apply to the woman with the lance, but again
the same arguments apply as for military necessity.
It is therefore highly likely that, on the basis of the facts and circumstances
and supposing that the evidence were beyond reasonable doubt, Lieutenant
Colijn would, hypothetically, have been held responsible for the crimes
18 Judgement, Kordic¤ and C› erkez (IT-95-14/2-T),Trial Chamber, 26 February 2001, x 449.
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committed by his subordinates. The ICTY would, therefore, have found him
guilty of war crimes.
In the second scenario, assuming that the ICTY had jurisdiction over crimes
committed in the past, the relevant international law instruments in force at
the time of the offence would be The Hague Conventions 1899 and 1907 and,
more specifically, the so-called ‘Martens clause’ contained in their preambles,
which states that ‘populations and belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and
the requirements of the public conscience’.19 Given that Martens based this
formulation on a legal idea that was already common at the time when the
atrocities in Tjakra Negara were committed, it is arguable that the acts to
which Colijn admitted in his letters were unlawful under international law
even at the time of their commission and that they violated what was then
already international humanitarian law in force.
If anything, the legal thought experiment makes clear that Colijn cannot
simply be considered and/or excused as ‘a child of his time’. From a
contemporary perspective, he may be seen as a ‘criminal in the context of any
time’ and the events in which he was involved may, retrospectively, be seen as
crimes of war.20 Yet, historians consider it senseless to judge events that
received their moral meaning in a specific historical context on the basis of
what we know now. To some it is a matter of ‘a-historic moralism’ to label
actions of historical figures such as Colijn as war crimes. To others, the use of
the concept of ‘war crimes’ in order to describe events that took place in the
past is ‘unzeitgema« ss’ or even ‘senselessly anachronistic’.
Like ‘a-historic moralism’, the accusation of ‘senseless anachronism’could be
brushed aside as merely rhetorical ç an effort to disqualify moral criticism
and protect the moral reputation of Prime Minister Colijn. However, if we take
the accusation seriously, it raises questions: What exactly is anachronism?
And what is the problem with it?
In what follows, I will discuss to what extent criminologists are guilty of
‘senseless anachronism’ when they use contemporary concepts to describe or
explain historical international crimes, i.e. atrocities that were committed in a
distant past. I will argue that talk about international crimes that have been
committed by historical figures should not simply be dismissed under the
19 Preamble, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, 26
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949, entered into force 4 September 1900; Preamble,
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 3 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, entered into force 26 January 1910. For an evaluation of the
clause, A. Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ 11 European
Journal of International Law (2000) 187^216.
20 Provided that these acts were criminal at the time they were committed, i.e. the breaches were
criminalized and a regime of individual responsibility was established by law which was ‘writ-
ten, clear and certain’. I will deal with retroactivity and the legality principle later on when dis-
cussing the issue of ‘legal anachronism’.
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banner of ‘a-historic moralism’ or ‘senseless anachronism’, but rather can be
reasonably explained and justified. But first, I will explain briefly what
historians mean by ‘anachronism’.
3. What is Anachronism?
Currently, ‘anachronism’21 is considered as an error in chronology caused by
relating an event, custom or circumstance to the wrong time period or, more
seriously, by describing past deeds in terms that were not available to the
agents themselves.22 Anachronism can, thus, be defined as ‘the impropriety of
depicting past phenomena in terms of present values, assumptions, or
interpretative categories’, which arises from a lack of awareness that the past
differs in fundamental respects from the present.23
A prominent example of anachronism is the use of the word ‘holocaust’. In
2001, historian Dan Diner noted that, until ‘well into the 1970s’, the scholarly
literature on the Second World ‘would grant the Holocaust a modest (if any)
mention’ but that by the end of the 20th century, it ‘tends to fill the entire
picture’.24 The word ‘holocaust’ was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 to
capture the special character of the genocide of European Jewry.25
Subsequently, it was used as an English translation for ‘Shoah’ in the preamble
to the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence. It became, however, generally
known only much later, following media productions like the Golden Globe
and Emmy Award winning American TV series entitled Holocaust (1978). It
was only by the end of the 20th century that the Holocaust gradually became
the dominant symbolic representation of evil and ‘for an increasing number of
Americans, and for significant proportions of Europeans as well, the most
widely understood and emotionally compelling trauma of the twentieth
century’.26 Following a process of dramatization and universalization, the
word holocaust is now ‘regularly invoked by people who want to draw public
attention to human rights abuses, social inequalities suffered by racial and
ethnic minorities and women, environmental disasters, AIDS, and a whole
host of other things’.27 In addition, the word holocaust is also used
anachronistically to describe other mass killings in the past, like the famine
21 Originally, the term ‘anachronism’comes from the Greek words ana (against) and chronos (time).
22 N. Jardine, ‘Uses and Abuses of Anachronism in the History of the Sciences’, 3 History of Science
(2000) 251^270, at 261.
23 S. Syrja« ma« ki, Sins of a Historian: Perspectives on the problem of anachronism (Academic
Dissertation, University of Tampere, 2011), at 23.
24 D. Diner, Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, and the Holocaust (University of
California Press, 2000), at 1, quoted in J. Alexander, ‘The Social Construction of Moral Universals’,
5 European Journal of Social Theory (2002) 5^85, at 27.
25 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
26 Alexander, supra note 24, at 34.
27 A. Rosenfeld, ‘The Americanization of the Holocaust’, 90 Commentary (1995), at 35. Quoted in
Alexander, supra note 24, at 51.
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during and after the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (1943^1946)
that has been called the (East) ‘Indian Holocaust’28 or the Spanish Civil War
(1936^1939) that has been called ‘The Spanish Holocaust’.29
These, and other, examples of anachronisms raise two sets of questions:
First, is any form of anachronism ‘senseless’ (and ‘senseless anachronism’,
therefore, a pleonasm)? Or can we distinguish between ‘senseless’ and useful
forms of anachronism? And second, does each and every form of anachronism
inevitably imply ‘a-historic moralism’? Or, if well-founded moral judgments of
historical events are possible, can the study of war crimes by historical figures
simply be dismissed in terms of ‘a-historic moralism’ or ‘senseless
anachronism’?
A. Useful Anachronisms
Anachronisms are abound in art, literature and the audiovisual media. In
many instances, anachronisms are not errors made as a result of the artist’s
ignorance. Artists may intentionally telescope time. A striking example of
such an intentional use of anachronism was a televised reconstruction of the
first day of the war in Indonesia.30 What happened in 1947 was brought to
the viewer by live correspondents in Djakarta, The Hague and Washington. It
was as if (colour) television already existed in those days.
While in art, literature and the media anachronisms are accepted or, at least
tolerated, in academia, anachronism tends to be considered a grave error,
although there are exceptions to this. Historian Peter Burke, for example, has
argued that anachronism may, indeed, be productive for historians.31
Generally, however, within historiography, the methodological fallacy of
‘anachronism’ is considered to be so serious that it has been called the
‘historical sin of sins’.32 Projecting ideas into the heads of historical actors by
attributing knowledge to them about a later course of events that,
chronologically, would be impossible for them to have had, is unacceptable.
Historians are not supposed to ‘understand the agent to be doing something
which he would not ç or even could not ç himself have accepted as an
account of what he was doing’.33 In this case, the methodological fallacy is
‘that the unavailability [of specific concepts] prevented the individuals
28 J. Hendrikx, De Indische Holocaust (Uitgever Hendrikx, 1999).
29 P. Preston,The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination inTwentieth-Century Spain (W.W.
Norton, 2012).
30 21 July 2012, after a book by Ad van Liempt, Nederland valt aan. Op weg naar een oorlog met
Indonesie« 1947 (Balans, 2012).
31 P. Burke, ‘Triumphs and Poverties of Anachronism’, 10 Scientia Poetica (2006) 291^298.
32 F. Manuel, ‘The Use and Abuse of Psychology in History’, in F. Gilbert and S. Graubard (eds),
Historical Studies Today (W.W. Norton, 2000) 211^237, at 128 (quoted by Syrja« ma« ki, supra note
23, at 93, note 211).
33 Q.R.D. Skinner,‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, 8 History andTheory (1969)
3^52, at 6.
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belonging to the given context from formulating certain propositions and be-
liefs’.34 When we impose concepts or categories onto a period in which they
were absent or still unknown, history becomes a ‘pack of tricks we play on the
dead’.35
Having been caught in the act of committing such a methodological fallacy
makes one feel ashamed for being so stupidly ‘unscientific’ and showing such
a total lack of awareness of the fact that the past differs, fundamentally, from
the present. But a closer look at the literature36 shows that this does not have
to be the case. Even historians do not consider every form of anachronism a
mortal sin. According to some, for example, definitions of anachronism that
describe ‘past deeds and past works in terms that were not available to the
agents themselves’ or ascribe ‘to past thinkers concepts they had no linguistic
means to express’, have set the bar too high.37 One reason for this is that,
even when the historian tries to keep strictly in line with his subject’s
perspective, anachronisms are unavoidable because the historian is tied to the
present and has knowledge that contemporary actors did not possess. The
historian knows, for example, the course and outcome of events which, at the
time, were uncertain and unpredictable.38 In this sense, it is impossible to
escape the present and, indeed, most historical explanations are based on
descriptions and classifications that were not available to their objects.39
However, the fact that the historian is tied to the present does not imply that
‘anything goes’ or that historians may freely project their contemporary
concepts, theories and perspectives onto a ‘defenseless past’.
There are many different types of anachronism,40 but the distinction
between descriptive and judgmental anachronism seems to be the most
relevant for a discussion of anachronism and international crimes.41 It is
important not only to be aware of the problem of anachronism but also to care-
fully distinguish between anachronisms that are simply inevitable and
anachronisms that are not inevitable but may be legitimate or even desirable.
34 B. Mitrovic, ‘Attribution of Concepts and Problems with Anachronism’, 49 History and Theory
(2011) 303^327, at 310.
35 Skinner, supra note 33, at 14.
36 Since anachronism is a central issue within historiography, it is surprising that the literature
on this topic is rather limited. Syrja« ma« ki, supra note 23, at 34.
37 S.G. Brush, ‘Anachronism and the History of Science: Copernicus as an Airplane Passenger’, 8
Scientia Poetica (2004) 255^264, at 256; quoted by Syrja« ma« ki, supra note 23, at 36.
38 As an observer who was born later, the historian cannot take the perspective of an innocent
participant because that would make writing history impossible: as every history presupposes
not only a beginning but also an end. Ibid., at 249.
39 A. Tucker, ‘Temporal Provincialism: Anachronism, Retrospection and Evidence’, 10 Scientia
Poetica (2006) 299^317, at 303.
40 See e.g. C. Condren, ‘A Reflection on the Problem of Anachronism in Intellectual History’, 8
Scientia Poetica (2004) 265^272. Condren makes a distinction between seven types of
anachronism.
41 A distinction between descriptive and judgmental anachronism has been made before, but
Condren makes this distinction more explicitly and clearly than anybody else (Syrja« ma« ki,
supra note 23, at 42).
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If the historian has the ambition to describe and explain past deeds, ‘then
description and explanation will demand categories not available to the
agents themselves’.42 Descriptive anachronism is inevitable because in the
language, we use concepts constantly emerge, change their meaning and/or
disappear.43 Would it, however, also be legitimate to describe, for example,
people as homosexuals, even if they lived in a time when the concept of
homosexuality had not yet entered the vocabulary? This form of descriptive
anachronism would be legitimate only if homosexuality were defined in terms
of the behaviour of people having sex with people of the same sex.44 It would
not be allowed to describe people as homosexuals in order to project the
modern idea of homosexuality on an earlier period, or to impose modern
values on a pre-modern world. In that case, we would commit a form of
judgmental anachronism. But maybe in cases of serious violations of human
rights even such a form of anachronism could be legitimate.
In a discussion of the work of historian Quentin Skinner, he is claimed to
have stated that ‘we cannot (logically) denounce the Chilean junta for failing
to uphold basic human rights, because they never had any intention of doing
so’.45 In response to this claim, it has been argued that:
Of course we can criticize the Chilean junta for not upholding basic human rights (and we
should), but it would be :::‘‘bizarre’’ to say that the junta failed in (its efforts) to uphold
human rights, or to accuse the junta being incompetent in this matter, because it never
made such an effort. We do think that it would have been able and fully competent to
uphold human rights had it only wished to do so. In other words it is perfectly in line
with Skinner’s thought to condemn the junta’s ignorance or maliciousness on the matter.46
In cases like this, anachronistic use of contemporary concepts, theories and
perspectives alien to the historical agents is not only ‘perfectly legitimate’, it
may even be desirable. Past agents may have deceived themselves about their
motives or simply have possessed a more limited understanding of the
processes they took part in or witnessed than historians enjoying the benefit
of hindsight.47 In other words, anachronistic ‘unfaithfulness’ to the concepts
and categories of past agents does not always constitute a historically
incoherent interpretation of past deeds. In some cases, retrospective
application of contemporary theories and conceptual frameworks to historical
events will allow a better understanding of historical events than was possible
42 N. Jardine, ‘Ethics and emics (not to mention anemics and emetics) in the history of the
sciences’, 42 History of Science (2004) 261^279, at 262.
43 C. Lorenz, De constructie van het verleden. Een inleiding in de theorie van de geschiedenis (6th edn.,
Boom, 2006).
44 A. Haddock,‘Anachronism and the Individuation of Concepts’, 8 Scientia Poetica (2004) 265^272,
at 265^266; quoted by Syrja« ma« ki, supra note 23, at 38.
45 J.V. Femia, ‘An Historicist Critique of ‘Revisionist’ Methods for Studying the History of Ideas’, 20
History and Theory (1981) 113^134, at 120, note 30.
46 Syrja« ma« ki, supra note 23, at 101.
47 Tucker, supra note 39, at 301^302.
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while they were taking place.48 In these instances, understanding the past in
contemporary terms, rather than in its own terms, can even be considered as
a manifestation of historical sophistication. Next, I will show how this works
when legal theories and conceptual frameworks are applied to historical
events, which is what criminologists of international crimes are often tempted
to do.
B. Legal Anachronism
What for historians is senselessly anachronistic may be compared with what,
within a legal perspective, is seen as illegitimate retroactivity.49 Legally, it is
not allowed to consider crimes as actions that, at the time they were
committed, were not prohibited and punishable by law. To do so would be a
violation of the principle of legality, which holds that a person may only face
criminal charges for an act that was prohibited by criminal law at the time
the act was committed. In the well-known formulation: nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine praevia lege poenali ç no crime without prior law.
In international criminal law, however, it has been considered admissible in
exceptional situations to adjudicate and convict defendants for actions that, at
the time they were committed, were tolerated, approved, propagated or even
enforced by the state. At the Nuremberg trials, for example, some lawyers
invoked the principle of legality by claiming ‘that the genocidal actions
committed during the Third Reich did not constitute crimes because they
were not violations of laws in effect at that place and time’.50 This claim was
overruled, however, by the counter-claim ‘that it was more significant that
these actions were criminal under Germany’s treaty obligations and pre-
existing German criminal law :::’.51 Neither were there laws that could
conceivably be construed as setting aside existing criminal laws in Germany
during the Nazi-era, such as proscription of murder. In fact, there existed only
a vague order in writing from Hitler who allowed for killing disabled people.
This order did not constitute law in any legal sense, however, even if the order
could be and has been regarded as legitimizing the killings by those who
executed them.
In fact, the prosecution went beyond the charges of conspiracy, conducting a
war of aggression and violating the rules of war by also accusing the Nazi
officials of ‘crimes against humanity’. This category of crimes was officially
recognized in the Charter of London and the Control Council Law No 10, but
did not exist before (or during) the war. Ultimately, the Nazi officials would be
48 We must, however, not confuse this kind of benevolent ‘retrospection’ with forms of pernicious
‘anachronism’. Ibid., at 311^312.
49 A. de Baets, ‘The Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Study of History’,
48 History and Theory (2009) 20^43.
50 D. Maier-Katkin, D.P. Mears and T.J. Bernard, ‘Towards a Criminology of Crimes Against
Humanity’, 13 Theoretical Criminology (2009) 227^255, at 228.
51 Ibid.
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tried and convicted not only for war crimes but also for crimes against
humanity.52
Since then, in international criminal law, there has been a tendency to relax
the principle of legality in exceptional situations. If necessary, the principle of
‘necessity knows no law’ may be applied and suspects may be indicted and
convicted on the basis of legal concepts that did not yet exist or, at least, were
not common at the time the crimes they were accused of were committed. In
these cases, a violation of the legality principle is seen as not only morally
justified, but even legally acceptable.
After a long process of ‘crystallization of opinio juris’ with regard to such a
rule or principle, at the beginning of the 21st century, a customary rule
providing that no statute of limitations applies to international crimes became
generally accepted.53 Already in 1966, the United Nations had decided that
persons could be prosecuted for acts that, at the time they were committed,
were ‘criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the
community of nations’.54 In 1968, a Convention of Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity was
adopted, which guaranteed imprescriptibility for war crimes and crimes
against humanity. From then on, these crimes could be prosecuted and
punished irrespective of the date of their commission and even if they did not
constitute a violation of the domestic criminal law of the country in which
these crimes were committed. However, only after 102 states ratified the ICC
Statute as of 1 September 2006,55 did a widespread and general practice
emerge of not applying statutes of limitation to international crimes. Since
then, ‘extension or suspension of prescription periods with regard to crimes
that have not yet become imprescriptible is generally accepted’.56
In various countries, domestic criminal law has followed this example by
ending prescription for crimes against humanity. In Argentina, for example,
domestic courts have affirmed the existence of a rule of customary interna-
tional law banning statutes of limitations for international crimes. After the
Supreme Court of Argentina ruled in 2005 that the amnesty laws of the
52 I. Buruma, ‘The Twisted Art of Documentary’,The NewYork Review of Books, 25 November 2010,
42^45, at 42, note 2.
53 R.A. Kok, ‘Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law’ (PhD dissertation, Center for
International Law, Amsterdam, 2007), at 337.
54 Art. 15(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
55 Art. 29 ICCSt.
56 Kok, supra note 53, at 340: ‘However, this is not yet the case for retroactively eliminating stat-
utes of limitation to crimes that had already become prescribed. Retroactive application is not
yet required by customary law and does not constitute a general principle of law.
Nevertheless, there are examples in domestic law of application of so-called suspension statutes
retroactively. This solution is based on the idea that suspects of international crimes should
not benefit from statutes of limitation during the period that they are systematically left unpun-
ished by a particular political regime. In this approach, statutes of limitation are deemed not
to have run during periods where there is no realistic prospect of international crimes being
prosecuted. Consequently, the issue of retroactive application of new rules does not arise here.’
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1990s57 were unconstitutional, because these crimes are ‘imprescriptible’,
prosecutions and trials of suspects for human rights violations during the
military dictatorship of 1976^1983 have been resumed.58
In general, within the context of international criminal law, the legality
principle tends to be applied more leniently and flexibly than within domestic
legal systems.59 By declaring that no statute of limitations applies to
international crimes, retroactivity seems no longer anathema. There is, at
least, a tendency to invalidate prescription for international crimes, even
when these crimes were committed in a more distant past. By invalidating
prescription for these crimes, the principle of legality may be overruled and,
providing the suspected perpetrators are still alive, they may be prosecuted
and adjudicated.
C. Historical Imprescriptibility
Even in cases in which suspected perpetrators themselves are no longer alive,
there seems to be room/need for redressing ‘historical injustices’.60 Legal
historian Antoon De Baets61 refers to the evolution of a ‘right to truth’, which
emerged as a legal concept in various jurisdictions and has been recognized
by a number of human rights treaties. This evolution of a right to truth as one
of the emerging principles in international law has been reconstructed in the
following way.62 Its origins can be traced to Articles 32 and 33 of the 1977
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949 that grant families the
right under international humanitarian law to know the fate of their relatives.
However, enforced disappearances of persons during periods of extreme state-
sponsored mass violence, particularly in various countries of Latin America,
led to the identification and recognition of a right to the truth. In 1988, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the rights of relatives of
victims of forced disappearance to know their fate and whereabouts and to
obtain clarification of the facts relating to the violations. In 1998, the court
held that the right to the truth applies to any kind of gross human rights viola-
tion. The UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances
and the UN Human Rights Committee expanded the right to the truth to
57 In 1990, President Carlos Menem issued a pardon for crimes against humanity that had been
committed during the military dictatorship 1976^1983. The pardon included the leaders of the
military junta who had already been convicted in 1985.
58 M.K. O’Donnell, ‘New Dirty War Judgments in Argentina: National Courts and Domestic
Prosecutions of International Human Rights Violations’, 84 New York University Law Review
(2009) 333^374.
59 M. Swart, ‘Judicial Lawmaking in the Context of International Criminal Tribunals’ (PhD diss.,
University of Leiden, 2006), at 327.
60 Historical injustice may be defined as ‘a wrong done either to or by past people’. J. Thompson,
Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice (Polity Press, 2002), at x.
61 A. de Baets, ‘Historical imprescriptibility’, Storia della Storiografia (2011) 59^60, 128^149.
62 I take this reconstruction fromY. Naqvi, ‘The right to the truth in international law: fact or fic-
tion?’ 88 International Review of the Red Cross (2006) 245^273.
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include details of serious violations of human rights and the context in which
they occurred.63
The ‘right to truth’ grants to victims of serious human rights violations and
their relatives a fundamental (indefeasible, non-suspendable and
imprescriptible) right to know the truth about the circumstances of those
crimes and, in the case of a death or disappearance, the fate of the victims.
This right also holds when the perpetrators have died, not been prosecuted or
been granted amnesty.64
Victims of human rights violations and their relatives may claim their right
to truth until they die. The right to truth is not only a right of victims and
their relatives, but also a right of society at large. Because the public interest
in the truth is not strictly legal, but historical, imprescriptibility becomes
‘virtually endless’.65 Regardless of how much time has gone by, it will never be
too late to ask for the historical truth.
Even though the process of truth seeking has no legal consequences, in
moral terms, it remains meaningful to investigate the circumstances in which
human rights violations took place. In this way, justice can be done concerning
what has happened in the past. This also applies to the excesses that took
place during the Dutch colonial wars and, more specifically, during the
above-mentioned military actions in Lombok in 1894 in which Lieutenant
Colijn was involved.
4. Historical Justice
It can no longer be maintained that historical events are to be seen strictly
within their own historical context and to be judged exclusively according to
the values and norms of that time. Stressing the contemporaneity of values
and norms will not work, if only because painful episodes in history and
uncomfortable historical events defy being laid to rest. Such episodes simply
will not go away; they continue to haunt us, thereby playing on our feelings
of guilt and forcing us to realize that the past is not over (yet). In this way,
they live on in the ‘here and now’, influencing what we think (or try to forget)
as well as what we do (or try to avoid).
In order to do justice to the past, we need, historiography needs, to rethink
some of the central concepts of historiography, including the notion of
63 United Nations (2006), International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, Art. 8, 24.2. See the Symposium on Enforced Disappearances published in 12
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 731^808. See also S. Garibian, ‘Ghosts Also Die:
Resisting Disappearance through the ‘Right to the Truth’ and the Juicios por la Verdad in
Argentina’, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 515^538.
64 For a discussion of whether and when the ICC might defer to national reconciliation programs
that involve amnesties, see D. Robinson, ‘Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth
Commissions and the International Criminal Court’, 14 European Journal of International Law
(2003) 481^505.
65 Ibid., at 294.
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anachronism and the linear conception of historical time on which it is
based.66 According to the linear perspective, every moment in time is imagined
as a fixed position on a chronological continuum. Anachronisms contradict
this linear notion of time to which most historians still subscribe.
Doing justice to the past, however, requires ‘a ‘‘radical critique’’ of this
dominant concept of historical time’.67 Such a radical critique has been offered
by the French philosopher of science Michel Serres, who considers a linear
notion of time to be nai« ve and unrealistic because, in reality, time is turbulent
and chaotic. In his view, a strict adherence to temporal linearity is not merely
inadequate. More importantly, it causes problems in how we think about
historical processes. As Serres argues in no uncertain terms: ‘All of our
difficulties with the theory of history come from the fact that we think of time
in this inadequate and naive way’.68
By way of an example, Serres describes how the life and work of historical
figures are continually being ‘historicized’ by locating them outside the ‘here
and now’despite the fact that, in reality, ‘[f]ew people and even fewer thoughts
are completely congruent with the date of their times’.69 On the other hand,
certain points of view are considered contemporary not because they are
embedded in the temporal present, but because they are made contemporary
by presenting them as such. Rather than locating historical acts and events
on a linear time scale, Serres proposes a ‘multi-temporal’ perspective.
The right to historical truth demands that linearity be replaced by a more
complex notion of time. An example is the notion of ‘spectral time’ developed
by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. He treats time as ‘spectral’, arguing
that (traumatic) historical events do not belong to the past but continue to
haunt us as specters in the present.70 Some have countered that Derrida does
not succeed in escaping linearity altogether. In this view, Derrida’s
deconstructive analysis subscribes every step of the way to the same linear
structure of time that it has called into question. This is, among other reasons,
due to its ‘inability to keep temporally loaded terms out of its articulation’.71 It
may, therefore, be preferable to follow Serres in his critique of linear time. In
his view time passes, but not in the metaphysical Derridean sense. According
to Serres, time can best be described as a topological sheet that wraps itself
around the world. In order to illustrate this notion of topological time, he uses
the example of a handkerchief:
66 B. Bevernage, ‘Time, Presence, and Historical Injustice’, 47 History and Theory (2008) 149^167,
at 167.
67 Ibid.
68 M. Serres and B. Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time (The University of Michigan
Press, 1995), at 59.
69 Ibid., at 61.
70 Spectral comes from ‘spectre’ (ghost, horror).
71 D. Wood, The Deconstruction of Time (Northwestern University SPEP Studies in Historical
Philosophy, 1989), at 113.
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If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it certain fixed
distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby
points and measure far-off distances. Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, by
putting it in your pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If,
further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close can become very distant.
(-) As we experience time ::: it resembles this crumpled version much more than the flat,
overly simplified one.72
Although it may be true that Derrida’s notion of spectral time does not suc-
ceed in escaping linearity altogether and that Serres’s supple, adaptable,
multi-directional, both horizontally and vertically, notion of topological time
is more realistic, the notion of ‘spectral time’ may still be useful. Recognizing
the spectrality of time can shed special light on the problematic and complex
relations to the past in situations where societies in transition try to carry on
with life after violent conflict.73 Indeed, it can shed some clarifying light on
the complex and difficult relationships with the past as they emerge, for ex-
ample, in transitional justice.
5. Conclusion
Generally, most criminologists study contemporary phenomena and, therefore,
feel they do not have to worry about the time dimension of their theoretical
perspective. This attitude cannot be maintained in the study international
crimes that are often historical events. When research focusses on ‘state
crimes of previous regimes’74 and the study of ‘old crimes’ from new
perspectives’,75 we should be aware of methodological problems implicated in
the use of contemporary concepts to describe and explain historical events.
This awareness becomes even more urgent when we use concepts that are
defined in international criminal law.
I have tried to show that the methodological fallacy of ‘anachronism’cannot
be avoided but that there are good arguments to ‘anachronistically’ consider
events in the past as international crimes regardless of whether or not
contemporaries could consider them as such. In order to try to understand the
motives of perpetrators of these crimes against humanity, we need to locate
them in the social, cultural and political contexts in which these events took
place. However, to judge the events in which they were involved, there is no
reason to strictly limit ourselves to the values and norms that were held at the
time.
From a modernist historical perspective, applying contemporary standards
to past events would be considered a senseless anachronism because a
72 Serres and Latour, supra note 68, at 60.
73 Bevernage, supra note 66, at 166.
74 S. Cohen, ‘Knowledge, Accountability, and the Policing of the Past’, 20 Law & Social Inquiry
(1995) 7^50.
75 M. Puniskis, ‘Old Crimes, New Perspectives’, Crime, Law and Social Change 54 (2010) 299^302.
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contemporary concept is being applied to a context to which it does not belong.
From a post-modern historical perspective, however, concepts and contexts
have no such degree of fixity to begin with and it is, therefore, justifiable to
make sense of events in terms that did not exist in the past as well as to ascribe
to actions meanings they did not have at the time.76 Strictly speaking, it could
be argued that giving up the linear notion of time renders the notion of an-
achronism itself senseless. However, I do not want to suggest that we should
discard the notion of anachronism entirely, because it may continue to serve
as a reminder that we need to rethink the notion of time in order to do justice
to the past. A reminder that may be especially needed for criminologists for
whom ‘the past is not something they think about very often’.77
Historical truth and justice require the application of both past and
contemporary perspectives to historical events because, even if international
crimes did not yet exist legally in the sense of being already criminalized in
international law, the acts and events to which these concepts refer were
committed in reality.78 And their consequences live on into the present. We
have to relate to them in terms of truth and justice, if only because not to do
so also implies a moral stance.
Retrospective moral judgments of past events are justifiable if these
judgments have a sufficient factual basis, are carefully and reasonably made,
and offer a contribution to public historical debate.79 Thus, if applied with
awareness and reflexivity, anachronisms do make sense and may, therefore,
be justified.
In short, it does make sense to define past wrongs ‘anachronistically’ as
crimes, even if (most) contemporaries at the time did not consider them such.
Moral judgments of historical events need not be solely based on values and
norms that were dominant in the past, but may, and in fact must, also take
current considerations into account. We can legitimately do this, without
running the risk of being ‘senselessly anachronistic’or becoming ‘a-historically
moralistic’.
76 M. Bevir, ‘Why Historical Distance Is Not A Problem’, 50 History and Theory (2011) 24^37.
77 P. Lawrence, ‘History, criminology and the ‘use’ of the past’, 16 Theoretical Criminology (2012)
313^328, at 314.
78 de Baets, supra note 61, at 295.
79 Ibid., at 297.
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